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management has been sharply debated. Critics maintain that
the state should stay out of the garbage business. Local governments lack sufficient funds and technical expertise to deal with
this ever-increasing problem. Establishment of the Solid Waste
Authority will facilitate cooperation with and aid to municipalities by recognizing solid waste management as a unique and
serious problem.
DONALD J. WALL

MUNICIPAL LAW
I.

CLAims AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES

A. Notice of Counterclaim
The Wisconsin court ruled in City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Civic Developments, Inc.' that section 62.25(1)2 of the Wisconsin Statutes applies to counterclaims filed against a city
when the city has instituted the original action. Section
62.25(1) generally requires filing a notice of claim with the city
council as a condition precedent to recovery on the claim.
Subsection (a) states:
(a) No action shall be maintained against a city upon a
claim of any kind until the claimant shall first present his
claim to the council and it is disallowed in whole or in part.
Failure of the council to pass upon the claim within 90 days
after presentation is a disallowance.
The City of Milwaukee had commenced an action against
defendant Milwaukee Civic Developments, Inc. The defendant
interposed several counterclaims, but did not present the counterclaims to the city council. The city asserted as a defense that
the condition of compliance with section 62.25(1) had not been
met. The circuit court upheld the city's position and dismissed
the counterclaim.
The supreme court affirmed. The defendant-appellant
argued that applying section 62.25(1) to counterclaims was not
in accord with the purpose of the statute, citing Pattermanv.
City of Whitewater,3 which had stated that the claim presenta1. 71 Wis. 2d 647, 239 N.W.2d 44 (1976).
2. Wis. STAT. § 62.25(1) (1973).
3. 32 Wis. 2d 350, 145 N.W.2d 705 (1966).
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tion requirement was intended to allow the city a chance to
settle claims. Once the action had been commenced, appellant
contended, this purpose was no longer served. The court's response was that filing a claim also served to alert the city to
upcoming expenses, whether of settlement or litigation, so a
notice of counterclaim requirement served the purpose of facilitating city budget planning.
The court also rejected the appellant's argument that there
was case law precedent for not requiring notice of claim filing
for counterclaims. The appellant had cited two related cases,
both entitled State v. City of Milwaukee,4 in which the state
had failed to present the claim to the city council. The court
in the first State v. City of Milwaukee case held the claim
statute inapplicable to the state. The second case allocated the
proportionate shares of the city and county in the judgment
obtained by the state in the first case. As to any filing requirement, the court in the second case said that once an action was
begun the notice of claim requirement did not apply. The court
in Milwaukee Civic Developments held that this language was
restricted to the unique facts in the State v. City of Milwaukee
cases, and that it would not be applied as precedent in the case
of a conventional counterclaim.
B. Tort Claims
The plaintiff in Binder v. City of Madison' brought a tort
action against the Area Vocational, Technical and Adult Education District No. 4 (VTAE District), but failed to notify the
district of his claim. There is no statute expressly requiring
filing of a notice of claim against a VTAE district. The district
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that section
118.26,6 which requires notice of a claim against a "school
district," applied to VTAE districts. The court agreed.
In holding section 118.26 applicable to VTAE districts, the
court found no indication of a legislative intent to exclude the
districts from the notice requirement that had applied under
section 118.26 when the now independent VTAE districts7 were
under local school district control.
4.
5.
6.
7.

158 Wis. 564, 149 N.W. 579 (1914); 145 Wis. 131, 129 N.W. 1101 (1911).
72 Wis. 2d 613, 241 N.W.2d 613 (1976).
Wis. STAT. § 118.26 (1973).
Wis. STAT. § 41.155 (1965).
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TOWN TERRITORY
In a series of recent decisions the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has developed the concept that in cases of municipal annexation of town territory under section 66.021 the "rule of reason"
is satisfied if a reasonable need for the annexed territory is
shown on the part of the city. In Town of Lafayette v. City of
ChiDpewa Falls,10 the court seems to have expanded even this
rule to provide that the "rule of reason" may be met if a need
for annexation on the part of the annexed territory is proven,
even absent any showing of need by the city.
All the territory involved in Town of Lafayette was stateowned and used as the site of a mental institution. Although
the state and a majority of the electors of the area petitioned
for annexation, it was undisputed that the original suggestion
for annexation had come from the city which could provide
necessary services that the town could not provide. However,
despite its interest in annexing the area, the city could show
none of the factors which the court has held to show need for
annexation by the city."
The issue, therefore, was whether a need for annexation by
the territory to be annexed was sufficient in itself to satisfy the
"rule of reason." The court held that, at least under the circumstances of Town of Lafayette, it was sufficient. The opinion, however, emphasized that the present situation was
unique in that the nature of the mental institution property
involved did not and never would lend itself to the types of
benefits traditionally held to meet the city need requirement,
whereas the benefits to the state would be substantial. In future decisions, the court will have the option of expanding the
Town of Lafayette rule to include conventional annexation sitI1.

ANNEXATION OF

8. Wis. STAT. § 66.021 (1973).

9. See Town of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha, 58 Wis. 2d 525, 206 N.W.2d 585
(1973); Town of Waukechon v. City of Shawano, 53 Wis. 2d 593, 193 N.W.2d 661

(1972); City of Beloit v. Town of Beloit, 47 Wis. 2d 377, 177 N.W.2d 361 (1970); Village
of Elmwood Park v. City of Racine, 29 Wis. 2d 400, 139 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
10. 70 Wis. 2d 610, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975).
11. These were first set out in Village of Elmwood Park v. City of Racine, 29 Wis.
2d at 411, 139 N.W.2d at 71, quoting the trial court's memorandum decision. The
factors included: a substantial increase in population; a need for additional area for
construction of homes, mercantile, manufacturing or industrial establishments; a need
for additional land area to accommodate the present or reasonably anticipated future
growth of the municipality; the extension of police, fire, sanitary protection or other
municipal services to substantial numbers of residents or adjacent areas.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:379

uations or of restricting it either to cases involving state-owned
property or to situations where the circumstances are such that
the likelihood of present or future need by the city is negligible
but the benefits to the territory proposed for annexation are
great.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the court has liberalized the
"rule of reason" requirement by recognizing at least one instance in which it is unnecessary to find need by the city for
the proposed annexation. The court pointed out,' 2 that although previous determinations of whether the "rule of reason"
was satisfied had considered the needs and wishes of the residents of the territory to be annexed, this had only been in
of need by the city, and not as the deteraddition to a showing
3
minative factor.'
Ill.

MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS

Section 66.29(5) of the statutes deals with the circumstances under which a bidder on a municipal public works contract
may recover his deposit after refusal to perform the contract
because of errors in his bid. In Nelson, Inc. v. Sewerage
Commission the court clarified this section respecting when
a bidder must give notice of error and the need for a bidder's
reasonable diligence in checking for errors.
Over a period of approximately two weeks after the plaintiff
construction company in Nelson had submitted its bid on a
sewerage construction project to the defendant commission, it
discovered five errors in its bid. It was only upon discovery of
the fifth error that the plaintiff decided that the cumulative
effect of the errors was so great that it could not perform the
contract, and thus immediately notified the commissions of
these errors. Section 66.29(5) specifically requires that:
In case any [bidder] shall make an error or omission or mis-

take and shall discover the same after the bids are opened,
he shall immediately and without delay give written notice
and make known the fact of such mistake, omission or error

which has been committed [to the municipal body] .. .6
12. 70 Wis. 2d at 629, 235 N.W.2d at 445.
13. Town of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha, 58 Wis. 2d 525, 206 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
14. 72 Wis. 2d 400, 241 N.W.2d 390 (1976).
15. Wis. STAT. § 66.29(5) (1973).
16. Id.

19771

TERM OF THE COURT

The Commission argued that the company had failed to
give proper notice because it waited until the fifth error had
been discovered, rather than notifying the commission on discovery of each separate error. The plaintiff countered that the
statute should be interpreted to require notice only if the bidder discovers an error which will prevent him from performing
the contract. The court agreed, stating, "The obligation to report errors and omissions 'immediately and without delay'
arises upon the discovery of a mistake which, in the judgment
of the bidder, would preclude the performance of the contract
as bid.""
The basis of the decision was that it was consistent with the
common law equitable rule permitting withdrawal of a bid because of a material mistake not due to the bidder's own failure
to exercise ordinary care. The court held that section 66.29(5)
was intended to be a codification of the common law rule, with
some limitations.
The commission also argued that although the statute expressly requires immediate notice only on discovery of an error,
there is an implied requirement of reasonable diligence in
checking for errors. The court found that although the plaintiff
had exercised such diligence, there was an implied standard of
diligence, premised on the intent of the notice requirement, to
minimize prejudice to the public body as well as to permit the
bidder to recover his deposit. This, the court noted, could be
effectuated only if the bidder was obliged to make an effort to
find errors in his bid as soon as possible.
lV. CAPACITY OF PUBLIC AGENCY TO SUE AND BE SUED
As numerous governmental functions have been delegated
to legislatively created agencies, boards, and commissions, the
supreme court has increasingly been called upon to determine
whether these bodies have the capacity to sue or be sued. 8
Although the general rule has been that such capacity does not
exist absent express statutory authority,"9 necessity has forced
17. 72 Wis. 2d at 409-10, 241 N.W.2d at 396.
18. See Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Wisconsin Rapids Education Ass'n, 70 Wis. 2d
292, 234 N.W.2d 289 (1975); Flood v. Board of Education, 69 Wis. 2d 184, 230 N.W.2d
711 (1975).
19. State ex rel. Board of Education v. City of Racine, 205 Wis. 389, 236 N.W. 553

(1931).
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the court to find exceptions to the rule.20 In the past, the court
has looked to the specific facts of each case to find grounds for
capacity to sue or be sued. In Racine Fire and Police Commission v. Stanfield,2 ' the court attempted to formulate a general
rule defining the circumstances under which a legislatively created body could sue or be sued in the absence of express statutory authority.
The case arose when the commission terminated four City
of Racine police officers. Over the objections of the commission, the terminated employees attempted to set up an arbitration panel. The commission, which contended that it had exclusive authority over employment of police officers, sought an
injunction restraining the arbitration. The defendants, the four
police officers and one of the named arbitrators, demurred on
the grounds that the commission lacked standing to sue. Generalizing from earlier cases, the court said:
The basis for the rule . . .appears to be that a particular
power or duty conferred by statute may, of necessity, require
the additional power to maintain or defend an action arising
out of that power or duty. This is not to say that a body which
is given the power to sue in one instance possesses that power
for all purposes and all cases. It is only where the capacity to
sue or be sued is necessary to carry out an express power or
to perform an express duty, or where the action arises out of
the performance of statutory powers or obligations that the
authority to sue or be sued exists."
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the court noted
that police and fire commissions have broad statutory powers
in regard to the employment of police officers. 3 Because the
question of whether these powers preempt arbitration was specifically raised by the commission's injunction for suit, the
court held that the action was one arising "out of the performance of statutory powers or obligations" and thus that the commission had the capacity to sue in this situation.
20. Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Wisconsin Rapids Education Ass'n, 70 Wis. 2d 292,
234 N.W.2d 289 (1975); Flood v. Board of Education, 69 Wis. 2d 184, 230 N.W.2d 711
(1975).
21. 70 Wis. 2d 395, 234 N.W.2d 307 (1975).
22. Id. at 401-02, 234 N.W.2d at 311.
23. Wis. STAT. §§ 62.13(5), (5m) (1973).
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V. DUE PROCESS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
In State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council,24 the court held
that a city officer subject to removal for cause is entitled to
fourteenth amendment due process rights. 25 The court based its
opinion on United States Supreme Court decisions holding
that a state employee entitled to continued employment has a
property interest in his employment sufficient to invoke due
process rights. 21 Since the decision was based on the fact that
the officer, a city clerk, was an employee entitled to retain his
job unless there was cause for removal, the question remains
whether a public official who is not also a public employee
enjoys a similar property right to his office.
Having decided that due process was required, the court
then considered whether the officer had been denied due process since the same members of the common council had been
involved in both the investigatory and the adjudicative por27
tions of the removal proceedings. Under section 17.12(1)(a),
the common council is empowered to remove elected city officers for cause. Several of the common council members had
been involved in preliminary investigations leading to the institution of removal proceedings, as well as having participated
in the removal hearing itself. The court found controlling the
rule of the recent United States Supreme Court case, Withrow
v. Larkin,2 which arose in Wisconsin. Larkin held that the
mere fact that the same body has participated in both phases
of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings does not violate due
process.
The Wisconsin court did find, however, that the officer's
due process rights had been violated in one respect. At the
opening of the hearing before the common council, the officer
by his attorney had requested from the council copies of any
statements in its possession of witnesses who would be called
in support of the charges. The request was denied. The court
held that due process in this case required production of the
statements for use in cross-examination. This is an extension
of the rule in criminal cases laid down in Jencks v. United
24. 72 Wis. 2d 672, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976).
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
26. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183

(1952).
27. Wis. STAT. § 17.12(1)(a) (1973).
28. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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3
1
States,2 and adopted by Wisconsin in State v. Richards..
Since the court did not state a general rule as to when this rule
applies outside of criminal cases, it is impossible to predict how
widely it might be applied. The court went on to hold, however,
that the officer had the burden of proving that he was prejudiced by the failure to produce the statements in order to establish a denial of due process and that no prejudice was shown
on the record.
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PROPERTY
I.

LANDLORD - TENANT

The legal rights of tenants were expanded this term in
College Mobile Home Park and Sales, Inc. v. Hoffman,' in
which the court held that exculpatory clauses in leases may
under some circumstances be invalid. The court refused to set
any absolute rule stating that certain categories of exculpatory
clauses are void, preferring to develop the rule by case-by-case
application.
College Mobile Home began as an eviction action commenced by the landlord for nonpayment of rent. The tenant
counterclaimed for personal injury and other damage allegedly
caused by the landlord's failure to maintain adequate heating.
The landlord moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim based on an exculpatory agreement in the lease releasing
the landlord from liability for property damage and personal
injury. The trial court dismissed the motion on the grounds
that the clause should not be enforced and the supreme court
affirmed.
The court first stated that although exculpatory clauses are
generally valid on the principle of freedom of contract, they are
usually strictly construed in favor of the tenant. It then noted
that several states have either legislatively prohibited such
clauses or judicially held them unenforceable as against public
29. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
30. 21 Wis. 2d 622, 124 N.W.2d 684 (1963).
1. 72 Wis. 2d 514, 241 N.W.2d 174 (1976).

